Although Taliban gains have been both considerable and rapid, it does not mean that a complete takeover of power is imminent. Warlords are now preparing to fight their corner and minorities such as the Hazara Shi-a communities, which are much at risk from Taliban rule, are forming their own self-defence militias.
In the face of this steep descent into insecurity, Western militaries have walked away in defeat, led by the Americans, and there is little prospect of any future intervention. The US concern with Afghanistan is now just centred on preventing ISIS, al-Qaida and other extreme paramilitaries from being able to expand their operations there, especially if they threaten US interests. That would be met by armed drone and strike aircraft operations combined with occasional use of special forces and, quite possibly, support for selected warlords, just like in the days immediately post 9/11.
France’s Withdrawal
Elsewhere, the focus is on the likes of ISIS, not least in Iraq where the group remains active. There, combatting ISIS is requiring a combination of Iraqi special forces and attacks with air strikes, the latter by both the Iraqi Air Force and the US and UK. The US also has eastern Syria in its sights, with American units protecting oilfields in the region from ISIS. There is also a more general concern that children and young people of ISIS descent who remain detained in camps are prey to indoctrination.
Even more significant is that al-Qaida and ISIS-linked groups are active in a broad swathe of Africa, stretching from the Atlantic and the Saharan Sahel region through to eastern Africa and the Indian Ocean. This has been developing for many years, certainly at least a decade, but has come to the fore primarily in the past five years.
Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger and Chad form a continuum, with Boko Haram and other groups in Nigeria linking up as well. The key zones are two tri-state border areas: Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger in the west and, 2,000km to the east, Niger again, together with Chad and Nigeria. Western states have been involved with much of the conflict, especially France, which has been keeping around 5,000 troops in the region for the best part of a decade, as part of Operation Barkhane.
Given the need to rotate deployments, this has become a major cost for the French Army – particularly since any gains made during the early fighting back in 2013 have been reversed over the past couple of years. Although US forces are involved, the numbers are much smaller and largely limited to special forces, intelligence and reconnaissance collection and drone operations, and President Biden is in no hurry to expand the commitment.
Now, the French have accepted that they are fighting an unwinnable war, a position not a million miles away from the Americans in Afghanistan. With this acceptance came the decision on 9 July to withdraw up to half of their forces.
France’s withdrawal may take several months, in which time more emphasis will go on armed drones and strike aircraft, while the country plans to increase and coordinate the use of special forces with the US. It is, in effect, a scaled-down version of the US-led pull-out from Afghanistan, allowing al-Qaida and ISIS-linked groups plenty of opportunity to expand.
Both retreats, the Americans in Afghanistan and the French in the Sahel, may be sold as a ‘job done’, but few will buy that. Instead, those who really are optimistic about the future are the leaders of the extreme movements, whether in Iraq, Syria, across much of Africa, Afghanistan, or elsewhere. Moreover, as COVID makes life even more difficult and the impact of climate breakdown has an even greater effect, recruiting followers from marginalised, bitter and angry young people will become progressively easier.
Source: OpenDemocracy